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This paper aims to explain the connectivity of whistleblowing online 
system between the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), 
the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and 17 ministries/
institutions that has been established since 2017. The challenges 
raised in the implementation of the whistleblowing online system 
are discussed in line with a case of the Ministry of Marine and 
Fisheries Affairs, a non-participant ministry in the connectivity of 
whistleblowing online system. The reason for selecting this case is 
to provide a different view of how a non-aligned institution within 
the network undertakes efforts in eradicating corruption through 
whistleblowing system. The discussion still leaves several obstacles to 
achieving an effective whistleblowing system. These constraints incl-
ude insecurity of mutation in remote areas due to reporting alleged 
frauds and a response to a fraudulent that consider reasonable. This 
article is intended to encourage further discussion and research 
regarding the implementation of whistleblowing online systems in 
government agencies in Indonesia
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Corruption is an abuse of public office to 
fulfil personal benefit that are contrary to 
the regulations (Mohamadi et al., 2017; Liu 
& Lin, 2012; Warren, 2004). Corruption 
is also defined as the sale of government 
property illegally, bribes on government 
projects, and embezzlement of government 
funds (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Svenson, 
2005). Mendez & Sepulveda (2006) show 
that corruption has a complex impact on the 
economy. The complexity of the impact of 
corruption can be known through various 
corruption cases that have occurred 
in Indonesia over the past few years, 
which prove that state/regional financial 
management is not carried out optimally 
to improve people’s welfare. The following 
is display 1.1 of the number of corruption 
cases of local government in 2016.
Display 1.1 proves that the highest 
number of corruption cases is in the 
West Java local government (154) 
cases. Meanwhile, North Maluku did not 
find corruption cases in 2016 (Attorney 
General›s Office, 2016). Guided by 
display 1.1, the average number of local 
governments in Indonesia is found to be 
a corruption case. This proves that the 
lack of morality, of the perpetrators of 
corruption (actors), weak law enforcement 
and bureaucracy, and the weakness of 
the effectiveness of monitoring, thus 
providing opportunities for perpetrators of 
corruption to commit corruption. The 2016 
data proves that the process of inquiries 
and investigation by the Attorney General’s 
Office, the High Prosecutor’s Office, the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the District 
Attorney’s Office experienced an increase 
Asia Pacific Fraud Journal, 4(1) January-June 2019: 68-77 | 69
Figure 1 
The number of corruption cases of local government in 2016
Source: processed secondary data, 2018
compared to the target. The target of the 
investigation and investigation conducted 
by the Attorney General›s Office is 110. 
Meanwhile, the achievement of education 
and investigations is 112 and 133. On the 
contrary, the target of the inquiries and 
investigation of the High Prosecutor›s 
Office, the Public Prosecutor›s Office, and 
the District Attorney’s Office is 1,350.
Meanwhile, the achievement of 
inquiries and investigation is 1.488 
and 1.394 (Attorney General›s Office, 
2016). This proves that corruption is 
still spreading in various regions in 
Indonesia which can affect the country›s 
economy in order to improve people›s 
welfare.
Corruption is not only stopped 
at the stage of inquiries and 
investigation. However, the handling 
of corruption continued to be before 
prosecution and prosecution. By 2016, the 
target of the Attorney General in the case 
before prosecution and prosecution is 
110. Meanwhile, the achievement before 
prosecution and prosecution stage was 
122 and 97. In contrast, the target before 
prosecution and prosecution of the High 
Prosecutor›s Office, the Public Prosecutor›s 
Office, and the District Attorney’s Office is 
1,350. Meanwhile, the achievement of 
the pre-prosecution and prosecution 
stages is 2,337 (Attorney General›s Office, 
2016). Finally, the results of achieving the 
handling of criminal acts of corruption 
for (1) the number of incracht cases is 
1,634; (2) cases that have been executed 
amount to 1,021; and (3) cases that have 
not been executed amount to 613. These 
results prove that corruption is a general 
phenomenon and is considered as an 
action that is common in government, so 
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it does not have a negative effect on the 
perpetrators of corruption (actors).
An important factor that is the 
question of the phenomenon of corruption 
is whether local governments are less 
capable of managing regional finance, 
thus providing opportunities for 
perpetrators of corruption to commit 
corruption? This study aims to examine 
and evaluate the effect of local government 
ability on corruption. Local government 
ability is the local government›s skills 
to implement public policies that 
could lead to the level of efficiency 
of his government. That is, the competence 
of local government is one of the 
important characteristics of government 
officials to carry out government activities 
with the aim of increasing efficiency in 
order to achieve public welfare. Capable 
local governments will be able to make 
public policy decisions to achieve a level 
of efficiency in managing government 
resources. The skills of local governments 
come from the experience including 
understanding the local government about 
the domains of public policy, strategy and 
technology. Efficiency efforts carried out by 
regional governments as a representation 
of the skills of local governments show 
that local governments are able to manage 
regional finances optimally, so they are 
free from corruption. The aim is to improve 
public services in order to achieve public 
welfare.
2. THEORICAL BASIS
Theory and Hypotheses Development
The Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT) explains 
that there are three important bases 
for individuals to commit fraud. The 
three important bases are (1) pressure, 
(2) opportunity, and (3) rationalization. 
Pressure is related to the encouragement 
of individuals to commit corruption. The 
cause is related to problems and financial 
needs. The opportunity is related to the 
access or opportunity of individuals 
to do corruption. The reasons are 
the weak system of control, regulation or 
abuse of office. Rationalization relates 
to justification for acts of corruption 
perpetrators who violate ethics, law or 
regulation. The three important basis of 
this theory cause individuals to commit 
corruption (Ruankaew, 2013).
One important factor to reduce the 
problem of corruption is the need for the 
ability of local governments to manage 
regional finance that is transparent, 
accountable, equitable, and free from 
corruption. Skills action local government 
is conducted by the local government 
in the realization of the right policies 
to achieve high levels of efficiency in 
order to improve the welfare of society. 
Schwab & Sala-i-Martin (2015) explains 
that government efficiency is related 
to the reduction of regulatory burdens, 
cost wastage, and transparency of 
regulations. Government efficiency will 
ultimately improve government 
performance (Lee & Whitford, 2009; Portes 
& Haller, 2010). 
Various appropriate policies 
can be carried out by capable local 
governments supported by experience, 
levels of intelligence services, strategies, 
and high levels of education, so that 
regional governments are able to improve 
public services in order to improve the 
welfare of the community.
Competent of local government will 
strive to improve the quality of government 
performance by using resources 
appropriately in order to provide added 
value for the welfare of society rather than 
the local government must take action 
corruption at high risk. The social impact 
of corruption is that the government 
fails to maintain public trust. Therefore, 
local governments are capable to be able 
to manage his government activity well, 
have accurate estimation capabilities, 
experts in carrying out their responsibilities, 
and use appropriate strategies in order to 
improve people’s welfare.
The implications of the knowledge 
management of public policies, the 
ability to make effective and efficient 
decisions, and the expertise possessed by 
local governments will provide added 
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value to local governments in increasing 
regional revenues, so that they can be used 
for public welfare. Through the skills of 
local governments, the government tends 
to act to achieve efficiency in regional 
financial management, thereby reducing 
corruption. Based on the description, the 
formulation of the hypothesis is as follows.
H1: Local Government Ability negatively 
effect on corruption
3. METHOD
The population of this study is all local 
governments in Indonesia with the 
2016 time period. The selection of the 
final sample uses criteria namely, the 
local government has complate data on 
publication of corruption cases, the amount 
of substitute money, financial reports, and 
Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) 
in 2016. 
This study uses data from some 
reference, namely (1) the site of Attorney 
General’s Office of the Republic of 
Indonesia with regard to the data of all 
local governments in Indonesia is involved 
in corruption cases in 2016, (2) the site of 
the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data-
related Gross Regional Domestics 
Product (GRDP) in 2016 , and (3) Site of 
Directorate General of Financial Balance 
(DGT) relating to financial report data for 
all local governments in Indonesia in 2016.
This study uses the main variables 
namely is the local government ability and 
the corruption. Meanwhile, the control 
variables are Gross Regional Domestics 
Product (GRDP) and Asset Growth. The 
function of the control variable is to control 
the influence of independent variables on 
the dependent variable, thereby reducing 
the bias of interpretation (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2014; Hartono, 2017). The 
following is a measurement of the three 
variables.
Local Government Ability
Local government’s ability is the skills 
of local governments to implement 
public policies that could lead the 
government to the level of efficiency. That 
is, the competence of local governments 
is one of the important characteristics of 
officials, government to run government 
activities with the aim of increasing 
efficiency and in order to achieve public 
welfare. Local government’s ability 
relates to the knowledge, skills and 
experience of government officials. The 
skills of local governments mainly 
come from the experience including 
understanding the local government about 
the domains of public policy, strategy 
and technology. Government officials 
who has domain expertise in 
implementing public policies become 
more experienced in managing regional 
finance. Local governments that have high 
skills produce more revenue based on a set 
of production factors to improve people›s 
welfare.
Measurement of local government 
ability using the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is an optimization program 
that is used to evaluate the relative 
efficiency of a unit in decision making 
by comparing output or multi output 
and input or multi input. Measuring the 
skills of local governments depends on 
the data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
to estimate the total efficiency of local 
governments. DEA indicates normative 
standards that are given all available 
data. The optimal standard value of 
DEA is 00%, while the value under 00% 
indicates less efficient. 
DEA requires identification of 
input and output variables.  This study 
uses revenue for local government 
as output variables. Meanwhile, 
the input variables are (1) the amount of 
local government assets, (2) Outstanding 
Revenue (Day Revenue), and (3) 
Expenditure of employees. To calculate 
the DRO (Days Outstanding Revenue), the 
researchers used the following equation.
In particular, this study uses the 
equation to calculate DEA as follows.
a. Total Asset
This study uses the number 
of assets as input because assets 
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are a resource factor that has 
an important role in generating 
regional revenues.
b. Days Revenue Outstanding (DRO)
This study uses DRO as input 
to measure the time needed by 
the local government to generate 
cash after the account receivable. 
The sooner the local government 
gets cash, then the better because it 
can be used to finance government 
operations activities.
c. Employee Expenditure
Another resources factor 
that influence local revenue is 
employee expenditure. Employee 
expenditure is a representation 
of the number of employees in 
generating local revenue. That 
is through local government 
employee, it can be seen that 
efficiency in generating local 
revenue for the benefit of public 
welfare.
Gross Regional Domestic Product (PDRB)
Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) 
is the amount of added value produced by 
all business units in a particular area, or is 
the total value of final goods and services 
(net) produced by all economic units (CBS, 
2010). This study uses Gross Regional 
Domestic Product (GRDP) at constant 
prices. Measurement of this variable uses 
logarithm natural of GRDP.
1. Asset Growth
Asset growth is a change in the amount 
of assets of the local government. This 
study uses the asset growth ratio to 
determine the development of changes 
in the assets of local governments as 
a result of government operational 
activities. The aim is to measure 
the strength of local government in 
providing public services to the public. 
The measurement of sales growth is as 
follows. 
Asset Growth= (Total Asset(t)-Total Asset (t-1) 
        (Total Asset (t-1)
2. Corruption
Corruption is the misuse of public 
office for personal benefits that are 
contrary to regulation (Mohamadi et 
al., 2017 ; Liu & Lin, 2012 ; Warren, 
2004 ) and illegal government property 
sales , bribery on government projects, 
and embezzlement of government 
funds (Shleifer & Vishny , 1993; 
Svenson, 2005). This study uses the 
amount of replacement money (RM) 
paid by the perpetrators of corruption 
(Actors) based on court decisions and 
audited. The amount of Replacement 
Money (RM) reflect the amount of 
local loss as a result of corruption. 
The measurement of corruption is as 
follows.
This study uses ordinary least 
square (OLS) to test the research 
hypothesis. The purpose of using OLS 
is to reduce the level of residual errors 
(Gujarati & Poerter, 2009). One form 
of representation of the use of OLS is 
testing normality, multicollinearity, 
and heteroscedasticity. The purpose 
of normality testing is to provide an 
explanation regarding the residual 
distribution of the research sample. 
Multicollinearity testing was carried out 
to detect correlation between independent 
variables. 
Meanwhile, the purpose of hetero-
scedasticity testing is to detect the in-
equality of residual variance from one 
observation to another. The BLUE research 
model is a research model which has a 
residual i normally distributed, there is no 
correlation between independent variables, 
and the variance is homogeneous. The rule 
of thumb for normality testing is through 
the significance value of kolmogorov-
smirnov (KS) > 0.05 0. Meanwhile, rule of 
thumb is testing multicollinearity of TOL 
> 0.1 and VIF < 10. For rule of thumb is 
testing heteroscedasticity (sig.) Glejser 
> 0.05. After testing the three classical 
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assumptions are fulfilled, then testing the 
hypothesis. The econometric equation 
testing hypotheses is as follows.
Corruption=α + β1 Local Government 
Ability + β2 GRDP + β3 Asset 
Growth + ε
Hypothesis decision making is (1) 
if β1 is negative and significant, then H1 
is supported. This means that the skills of 
local governments have a negative and 
significant effect on corruption. In other 
words, local government skills can 
mitigate corruption i. To find out the control 
variable, (1) if β 2 is positive and significant, 
then GRDP has a positive and significant 
effect on corruption. In other word, the 
higher of GRDP, the higher of corruption, 
(2) if β 3 is positive and significant, then 
asset growth has a positive and significant 
effect on corruption. In other words, the 
higher the growth of assets, the higher the 
corruption.
4. RESEARCH RESULT AND 
DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics are an overview 
of the use of research variables. The 
following is table 1 of the results of testing 
the descriptive statistics of each variables 
used in this study. 
Table 1 shows that the number of 
samples of this study to examine the effect 
of local government skills on corruption 
amounted to 31 samples. This study only 
uses a sample of 31 local governments 
from 34 regional governments based 
on published data from the Republic 
of Indonesia Attorney General›s Office 
about the number of corruption cases and 
substitute money based on court decisions 
and audited.
Descriptive statistics of local 
government skills in Table 4.1 range from 
21.79% to 100%. The value of 21.79% is 
the value of the skill of the DKI Jakarta 
government. This means that the use 
of production factors such as assets, 
DRO, and personnel expenditure to 
generate regional revenues has not 
been carried out efficiently. Meanwhile, 
the value of 100% is the skill value 
of Lampung, West Java, Banten, DIY 
Yogyakarta and West Kalimantan local 
governments. This shows that the use 
of production factors such as assets, 
DRO, and employee expenditure has 
been carried out efficiently by these five 
provinces. The average skill score of 
the local government is 61.42%. Local 
governments that have skills below the 
average sample are the governments 
of West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, Bangka 
Belitung Islands, Bengkulu, DKI Jakarta, 
Central Java, Central Kalimantan, South 
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North 
Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Southeast 
Sulawesi, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, 
East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, North 
Maluku, and Riau Islands. Meanwhile, 
the skills of the regional governments 
above the average sample are Aceh, North 
Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, 
West Java, Banten, DI Yogyakarta, East 
Java, West Kalimantan, Gorontalo, South 
Sulawesi, and Papua. The standard 
deviation of the skills of the government is 
20, 70% shows the volatility of the research 
skills of the local government.
The results of testing descriptive 
statistics in Table 1 show that GDP 
at constant prices ranges from 
23.79 - 28.06. GRDP value of 23.79 owned 
by the North Maluku regional 
Table 1
Descriptive Variables
Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Local Government Ability 31 21,79 100 61,42 20,705553
GRDP 31 23,79 28,06 25,76 1,150501
Asset Growth 31 -0,0135 0,52 0,14 0,102784
Corruption 31 0,00 1,59 0,08 0,282462
Source: Processed Secondary Data, 2018
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government. While The 28.06 GRDP 
value is owned by the DKI Jakarta 
government. Local governments that 
have below average GRDP values are 
the governments of Aceh, West Sumatra, 
Jambi, Bangka Belitung Islands, Bengkulu, 
DI Yogyakarta, West Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, North 
Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, 
Southeast Sulawesi, Bali, West Nusa 
Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, 
North Maluku, and Papua. Meanwhile, 
the GRDP value above the sample 
average is owned by the governments of 
North Sumatera, Riau, South Sumatera, 
Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten, 
Central Java, East Java, East Kalimantan, 
South Sulawesi and Riau Island. The 
standard deviation of the GRDP value is 
1.15 indicating the volatility of the research 
variable of GRDP.
Table 1, descriptive analysis shows 
that the growth of local government 
assets ranges from (-0.01)-0.52. The 
asset growth value of -0.01 is owned by 
the Banten and East Kalimantan regional 
governments. Meanwhile, the value of 
asset growth of 0.52 is owned by the local 
government of Bali. Local governments 
that have below-average asset gro-
wth values are the governments of 
South Sumatra, Bangka Belitung Islands, 
Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten, 
East Java, West Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East 
Kalimantan, Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, 
Southeast Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, 
West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Riau 
Islands. Meanwhile, the value of asset 
growth above the average sample is 
owned by the governments of Aceh, South 
Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, 
Bengkulu, Central Java, Yogyakarta, North 
Sulawesi, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, North 
Maluku and Papua. The standard deviation 
of the asset growth value is 1.10 indicating 
the volatility of the asset growth research 
variable.
The results of the systematic descriptive 
corruption in Table 1 show a range of 
values between 0.00%-1.59 %. The value 
of 0.00 % is the value of corruption in the 
regional government of North Maluku. 
That is, in this area there are 
government corruption and replacement 
money for 2016. Meanwhile, value of 
1.59% is the value proportion Jakarta 
government corruption. This means that 
corruption actors (actors) in the DKI Jakarta 
government commit corruption as much 
as 1.59% of the assets of the DKI Jakarta 
government. The higher the proportion 
value of corruption shows the higher the 
level of corruption. Proportion corruption 
mean value was 0.08%. Local governments 
that have a proportion of corruption below 
the average sample are the Aceh regional 
government, North Sumatra, West 
Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, Bangka 
Belitung Islands, Lampung, Bengkulu, 
Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java, 
West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, 
South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, 
North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Central 
Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Bali, West 
Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, 
Tabel 2








Normality K-S 0,971 Supported
(Sig.) 0,302
Multicollinearity Tolerance 0,972 0,955 0,960 Supported
VIF 1,028 1,047 1,041
Heteroscedasticity Glejser (Sig.) 0,564 0,705 0,385 Supported
Source: Processed Secondary Data, 2018
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Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and the 
Riau Islands. Meanwhile, the proportion 
of corruption above the average sample is 
Jambi, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten and 
South Sulawesi. The regional standard 
deviation is 0.28 % indicating the volatility 
of the corruption research variable.
Table 2 shows the result of testing 
classical assumption, namely is testing 
normality, multicollinearity, and hetero-
scedasticity. The results of normality 
testing indicate that the value of kolmogorov-
smirnov (KS) is 0.971 with a significance of 
0.302> 0.050. The results of this test prove 
that the residuals of the study sample 
are normally distributed. The results of 
multicollinearity test showed that the 
TOL value> 0.1 and VIF value <10 , and 
the results of heteroscedasticity testing 
showed that the significance value of 
the glejser test (Sig.> 0.050). The three 
results of testing classic assumptions 
prove that this research model has met the 
classical assumption test.
Table 3 shows the results of testing 
hypotheses and control variables. H1 states 
that the skills of local governments 
negatively affect corruption. The test 
results show that the coefficient value of 
the influence of local government skills on 
corruption is (-0.005), t-statistic is worth 
(-2,326), and significance (0.028). The 
results of this test prove that the skills of 
local governments have a negative and 
significant effect on corruption. Capable 
local governments will strive to improve the 
quality of their government performance 
by using resources appropriately in order 
to provide value added to the welfare of 
the community than the local government 
ust carry out high-risk acts of corruption. 
The implications of the knowledge 
management of public policies, the ability 
to make effective and efficient decisions, 
and the expertise possessed by local 
governments will provide added value to 
local governments in increasing regional 
revenues, so that they can be used for 
public welfare. Through the skills of local 
governments, the government tends to act 
to achieve efficiency in regional financial 
management, thereby reducing corruption.
The test results of the control variables 
influence the Gross Regional Domestic 
Product (GRDP) on corruption show the 
coefficient value is (0.114), t-statistic is 
worth (2.889), and significance (0.008). The 
results of this test prove that Gross Regional 
Domestic Product (GRDP) has a positive 
and significant effect on corruption. This 
finding shows that the higher the Gross 
Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), the 
more opportunities for corrupt actors 
(actors) to commit corruption. GRDP is 
a representation of regional economic 
growth, so that when GRDP is high, 
corruption actors see this as an opportunity 
to commit corruption because of the 
availability of production factors.
The test results of the control variables 
influence the growth of assets on corruption 
show the coefficient value is (-0.406), 
t-statistic is worth (-0.925), and significance 
(0.363). The results of this test prove that 
the growth of local government assets has 
no significant effect on corruption. This 
finding shows that the growth of local 
government assets cannot cause corruptors 
Table 3
Hypothesis Testing Results
Hipotesis Coefficient t-Statistic Sig. Information
Local Government Ability -> Corruption -0,005 -2,326 0,028 Supported
Control Variable
GRDP -> Corruption 0,114 2,889 0,008 Supported
Asset Growth -> Corruption -0,406 -0,925 0,363 No Supported
Adjusted R2 = 0,264
F = 4,581
Sig. = 0,010
Source: Processed Secondary Data, 2018
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to commit corruption. When viewed from 
descriptive statistics, the average growth 
of regional assets is 0.14 (14%). This shows 
that changes in regional assets are not too 
significant.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This research is a research model 
development based on various pheno-
menon of corruption cases that occur in 
local governments. This phenomenon the 
becomes an important public concern, so 
it needs to be empirically tested and the 
results can be used as recommendation for 
government policies in managing regional 
finance that are transparency and anti-
corruption. The results of the study have 
several important implications for the 
attention of various stakeholders. These 
implications are related to the theoretical 
implications and policy. The results of this 
study have implications for the theory that 
one important factor for individuals to 
commit corruption is opportunity. Based 
on the findings of this study, it can be seen 
that GRDP has a positive and significant 
effect on corruption. This means that the 
high GRDP is seen by perpetrators of 
corruption as an opportunity for corruption 
due to the availability of production 
factors. To reduce the opportunity for 
corruption, the skills of local governments 
are needed to manage regional finances that 
are transparent, accountable, equitable, 
and corrupt. The findings of this study 
have implications for government policy, 
namely, local governments need to make 
efficiency in managing regional finance 
as a form of representation of the skills of 
local governments. Through the efficiency 
of regional financial management, local 
governments can improve the quality of 
their government performance by using 
resources appropriately, thereby reducing 
corruption. Finally, public services can 
be improved and have implications for 
people›s welfare.
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